Attorneys for Talladega County Circuit Judge Chad Woodruff, attorney Buddy Campbell and members of the Talladega County Judicial Selection Committee have filed a motion with the state Supreme Court asking that body to reconsider a 7-2 decision essentially voiding Woodruff’s election.In a Nov. 30 decision, a unanimous court held that a 2006 act providing for a gubernatorial appointment of Talladega’s third circuit judgeship was unconstitutional. Seven of the justices, however, held that the unconstitutional portion of the law was severable from the rest of it, meaning the position is to be filled by election in 2010.
Woodruff was elected in 2006 and sworn in in February of this year, after a circuit court ruling that the appointment language was unconstitutional and unseverable. This ruling was appealed and partially reversed by the Supreme Court.
Woodruff qualified for the office after the appointment bill had been passed by the Legislature but before it had been signed into law by the governor.
Campbell filed suit in Talladega County Circuit Court that summer, winning an early victory when Judge Jerry White, a retired circuit judge from Houston County appointed to hear the case when Talladega Circuit Judges Julian King and Bo Hollingsworth recused themselves, ruled that Woodruff’s name had to be included on the November ballot.
This is the basis for one of the grounds on which the parties are asking to be reheard by the high court. If, they argue, the state wished to prevent the office from being filled by election, they should have appealed White’s ruling that Woodruff must be listed on the ballot.
The argument for rehearing is broken down into three major components in the brief filed earlier this month.
First is that “the sanctity and integrity of the electoral process is better served by upholding Chad Woodruff’s election than nullifying it.”
The argument on this point begins by pointing out that the right to vote is among the most sacred rights there are, and that the law has recognized and upheld this principle on numerous occasions.
“Unfortunately, this court’s opinion nullifies the 14,000 votes cast for Chad Woodruff in the November 2006 election, and will regrettably open the door to public perception that the sanctity of the electoral process was compromised by the Legislature’s late passage of (the appointment act). As we pointed out in oral argument, this situation was entirely avoidable by a timely pre-election appeal, which this court would have heard on an expedited schedule.”
The motion then cites a previous high court opinion saying that any objection to a nomination must be made before the candidate’s name appears on the ballot. It also cites a state law that says no court has any jurisdiction over an election unless there is a specific statute giving jurisdiction.
“To put it another way, it surely must be more important to uphold the sanctity of the electoral process where 14,000 voters have ‘fully, fairly and honestly expressed their will,’ than to give only partial effect to legislative intent in an unconstitutional statute, where the court can of necessity only guess what the Legislature would have preferred. (Also), to uphold the Legislature’s belated cancellation of the 2006 election (after Woodruff qualified) necessarily subordinates the sanctity of the electoral process to legislative whim.”
The second point makes many of the same arguments as the first regarding timeliness and lack of jurisdiction over elections after they have been held, and asks the court to find the law in this case “merely requires that the state be held to the same due diligence as others in such matters.”
Again, the motion asks the court to find the appointment act “came at least one day too late to stop the election process set in motion by Woodruff’s qualification” and/or that the state’s failure to appeal “requires dismissal now, because it was no different from any other failure of a party to timely pursue a remedy required under existing law.”
Cited examples include the statute of limitations in criminal cases, time frames for notices of appeal in civil cases and limits on assessing back taxes.
The third point argues that the appointment language and the date of election language are not, in fact, severable.
The act called for an appointment to be made in October 2009, and an election to be held the following year. The request argues that the intent of the Legislature was to have a sitting judge by the end of 2009 and throughout 2010, not to have a judge elected in November 2010, but not sworn in until early 2011.
The dissenting opinion in the November ruling, written by Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb with Justice Tom Parker joining her, agreed the two provisions of the bill were not severable.
Attorney General Troy King, the appellant in this case, will now have until Dec. 28 to file a response to the motion for rehearing, according to Presiding Circuit Judge Julian King.
It will then be up to the Supreme Court to grant the rehearing or refuse it and then issue a final order. Until the order is finalized, Woodruff technically remains a judge.
Under Alabama’s rules of procedure, any cases that Woodruff has heard but not ruled on can be handed over to another judge. The new judge may either rule based on the existing record or may call for further witness testimony.
King said few cases that Woodruff heard do not have rulings entered, but there are a few, including the Civil Service appeal in the Tim Pitts case by the city of Talladega.
The November ruling leaves the possibility open that the Legislature could fill the position by election in November 2008, but it is not clear what the likelihood of this happening might be.
Sen. Jim Preuitt, D-Talladega, who introduced the appointment legislation, and Rep. Steve Hurst, D-Munford, who supported it in the House, were both unavailable for comment Thursday. Rep. Ron Johnson, R-Sylacauga, opposed the appointment legislation when it passed.
Woodruff qualified and was elected as a Democrat, and Cobb, the Supreme Court’s sole Democrat, wrote the dissenting opinion.
